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NOTE
PLEA BARGAINING AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AT BAIL HEARINGS
Charlie Gerstein*
A couple million indigent defendants in this country face bail hearings
each year and most of them do so without court-appointed lawyers. In two
recent companion cases, Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the Su-
preme Court held that the loss of a favorable plea bargain can satisfy the
prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. If the Consti-
tution requires effective assistance of counsel to protect plea bargains, it
requires the presence of counsel at proceedings that have the capacity to
prejudice those bargains. Pretrial detention has the capacity to prejudice a
plea bargain because a defendant held on bail will plead guilty when faced
with any deal that promises he will serve less time than he expects to wait
in jail. Because a bad outcome at a bail hearing can prejudice the defend-
ant in subsequent plea bargaining, bail is now a critical stage.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a prosecution in Texas for, say, disorderly conduct. The facts of
the case are simple: the defendant was arrested while waiting for a friend in
the lobby of a housing project. The only issue in the case is legal: Did the
defendant's conduct "tend[] to incite an immediate breach of the peace"?'
The defendant is brought before a magistrate and, without counsel, held on
bail that he cannot pay. A few days later, the prosecutor calls with a plea
deal to time served. The defendant is constitutionally entitled to counsel in
accepting or rejecting that plea deal,2 but the prosecutor reminds him that
appointing counsel can take quite a long time-and, don't forget, if he takes
the deal, he gets out today. The defendant takes the deal without counsel,3
although his conduct could not possibly have tended to incite a breach of the
peace: there was no one else around.
When the defendant was brought before the magistrate and held on bail,
was he denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of his proceed-
ings?
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."'4 But the defendant only actually gets a lawyer when two criteria
are met. First, the right to counsel must have "attached." "Attachment" oc-
curs at the first formal, adversarial proceeding against the defendant, even if
that procedure does not involve a prosecutor.5 Second, the proceeding at
which the defendant seeks assistance of counsel must be a "critical stage" of
the prosecution. 6 Critical stages are pretrial procedures so dangerous to the
defendant, or so similar to a trial itself, that they require the presence of
counsel to protect the defendant's trial rights.7
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the effective assistance
of counsel, as well as her mere presence, at all critical stages. For an attor-
ney's performance to qualify as ineffective, it must be both constitutionally
1. T X. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(1) (West 2011).
2. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
3. One can waive the right to counsel attendant to a guilty plea. E.g., Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194-95 (2008); see also United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) ("[The right attaches] at or after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hear-
ing, indictment, information, or arraignment." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977).
6. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967); Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 217
(Alito, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307-14 (1973).
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deficient and prejudicial.8 The prejudice prong of the inquiry requires that
the result in the case absent the attorney's errors and omissions would have
been better for the defendant. 9 In two recent companion cases, Lafler v.
Cooper0 and Missouri v. Frye," the Supreme Court held that a plea bargain
is a "result" that can be the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim: if your lawyer's deficient representation causes you to reject a plea
bargain that you would have otherwise taken, and the actual result at trial is
worse than what was offered during the plea bargain, your Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated.
Among other adverse consequences, 2 a bad outcome at a bail hearing
can force an indigent defendant to plead guilty. Many indigent defendants
cannot post even minimal bail. 3 Defendants who are required to post bail
that they cannot afford may end up pleading guilty to avoid waiting in jail.'4
If the sentence offered by the prosecutor in a plea deal is shorter than the
expected wait for trial or bail review,'5 all but the most stubborn of defend-
ants would plead guilty. For a defendant charged with a relatively minor
offense, the bail hearing can be the main event; a bad outcome can seal his
fate. Because the bail determination is likely unrelated to the defendant's
culpability, its effect on his plea decision is prejudicial.6 It does not cause
him to plead guilty because he is guilty; it causes him to plead guilty be-
cause he has been held on bail.
8. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
9. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.
10. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
11. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
12. See, e.g., Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960) ("[In the case of an
indigent defendant, the fixing of bail in even a modest amount may have the practical effect of
denying him release. The wrong done by denying release is not limited to the denial of free-
dom alone. That denial may have other consequences. In case of reversal, he will have served
all or part of his sentence under an erroneous judgment." (citation omitted)).
13. In 2010, in New York City alone, 16,649 defendants were unable to make bail set at
one thousand dollars or less. Daniel Beekman, New Version of Charitable Bond Bill Headed to
Cuomo's Desk Could Free Thousands of Poor Bronx Defendants, DAILY NEWS (June 27, 2012,
6:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-yorkbronx/new-version-charitable-bond-bill-
headed-cuomo-desk-free-thousands-poor-bronx-defendants-article- 1.1102795.
14. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) [hereinafter
Natapoff, Misdemeanors]; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors Are Far from Minor, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (May 18, 2012, 8:20 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/sunday-
commentary/20120518-alexandra-natapoff-misdemeanors-are-far-from-minor.ece. See generally
Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BuFF. L. REV. 333, 348-52 (2011)
[hereinafter Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation]. A defendant can expect the walt in
jail to be up to two months long. Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The
Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 [hereinafter Col-
bert, The Illusory Right].
15. Defendants can, of course, petition the court for review of their initial bail determi-
nation
16. See infra Part I.
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Surprisingly, there is no federal right to appointed counsel for indigent
defendants at bail hearings, 7 and most states do not appoint counsel at all
in such hearings. 8 So most indigent defendants (who represent the over-
whelming majority of criminal defendants in this country) 19 face bail
hearings without counsel. But, according to a study in Baltimore, defend-
ants with counsel are more than twice as likely to be released on their own
recognizance. 20 And, when represented defendants are granted bail, it is on
average around six hundred dollars less than what is set for unrepresented
defendants. 2' Appointing counsel at bail hearings, then, will substantially
reduce the amount of time a substantial number of indigent defendants
spend in jail awaiting their trials. And that will cut down on the number of
plea deals those defendants have to take just to get out of jail-regardless of
their guilt or innocence.
The right to the presence of counsel and the right to her effective assis-
tance are coterminous-if you get one, you get the other. The Constitution
requires the presence of counsel at all stages that can prejudice the "outcome"
of a criminal proceeding, and the Supreme Court recently held that plea bar-
gains are protected "outcomes" for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes.
So, if the Constitution requires effective assistance of counsel to protect plea
bargains, it requires the presence of counsel at proceedings with the poten-
tial to substantially prejudice those bargains.
This Note argues that a bail hearing is a critical stage because it can
prejudice the outcome of a plea negotiation. Part I summarizes critical-stage
jurisprudence and concludes that, because it is concerned with a stage's po-
tential to affect the outcome of the criminal prosecution, critical-stage
analysis is conceptually linked to the prejudice inquiry for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Part II explains that the Court has recently ex-
panded ineffective assistance of counsel claims to include the loss of a
favorable plea bargain. Part III argues that the Court should make bail hear-
ings a critical stage because bail has the potential to irrevocably prejudice
the outcome of a plea negotiation. This Part also argues that a bail hearing
triggers the attachment of the right to counsel. Part IV addresses some pos-
17. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 214 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring).
Of course, a defendant may bring a lawyer if he can afford one.
18. Although these statistics are significantly complicated by procedural variance with-
in states, less than half of U.S. states provide lawyers for indigent defendants at all bail
determinations held within forty-eight hours of arrest. See Colbert, Prosecution Without Rep-
resentation, supra note 14, at 386 & n.291 (citing a 2008-2009 survey).
19. See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT
DEFENSE 1 (1996), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf (citing 1991
data indicating that about 75 percent of state prison inmates were represented by appointed
counsel).
20. See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and
Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2002) [herein-
after Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?] (describing the results of a controlled study on the
effects of counsel at bail determinations in Baltimore).
21. Id. at 1753-54.
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sible concerns with labeling bail a critical stage and concludes that they are
misplaced.
I. THE LINK BETWEEN PREJUDICE ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL STAGES
Although the right to appointed counsel and the right to the effective as-
sistance of that counsel are separate doctrinal areas of law, the two rights are
conceptually linked and most likely coterminous.2 2 This Part argues that
critical-stage analysis (by which the right to counsel is determined) and the
prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington23 (by which the right to effec-
tive assistance is enforced) should be analyzed similarly because they each
ask the same essential question: Does the denial of a given right have the
potential to work an unfair outcome for the defendant? Because of this link,
a bail hearing's ability to prejudice a plea bargain makes it a critical stage.
Section L.A asserts that all judicial inquiries into critical stages have been
concerned with the potential of a stage to prejudice the trial. Section I.B
argues that Strickland asks the same question; the only relevant difference is
that Strickland asks the question in the context of a defendant's specific trial.
Section I.C concludes that, since these questions are conceptually linked,
courts should analyze them similarly.
A. Critical Stages: A General Prejudice Inquiry
Critical-stage analysis 24-in all its incarnations-asks whether denying
counsel at a given stage has the potential to work an unfair outcome at the
ultimate criminal trial. It asks, hypothetically, considering the possible out-
comes of the stage, whether that stage is sufficiently likely to produce
results that derogate from trial rights. This question can be framed in two
ways: whether counsel is necessary at the stage to secure the defendant's trial
22. See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1174-75 (2012) (arguing that if Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970) (plurality opinion), remains good law, it would be absurd to deny defendants meaning-
ful claims to ineffective assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing). But see Custis v.
United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994) ("[F]ailure to appoint counsel for an indigent defend-
ant [is] a unique constitutional defect."). Custis, however, concerned the right of a federal
defendant to collaterally attack prior state convictions used to enhance his federal sentence. Id.
at 490-97. Its unique procedural context renders the case easily distinguishable; the portion of
the opinion asserting that the right to appointed counsel is unique rests in large part on the
ability to discern its violation from the face of a prior conviction. Id. at 496 ("Ease of admin-
istration also supports the distinction.").
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Some examples may be helpful. A post-attachment corporeal lineup is a critical
stage, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967), but taking a handwriting exemplar for
future comparison is not, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967). Post-attachment
photo arrays are not critical stages. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 325 (1973). Arraign-
ments and post-indictment interrogations are critical stages. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52, 53 (1961) (arraignment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (post-
indictment interrogation). However, judicial determinations of probable cause are not. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (no relation to the author).
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rights-as exemplified by United States v. Wade25---or whether counsel is
necessary because the stage is sufficiently trial-like and tricky-as exempli-
fied by United States v. Ash.26 Both methods, however, are concerned with
derogating from the ultimate right: a fair trial.
The Wade method obviously considers the effects at the ultimate trial: it
simply asks if the "stage of the prosecution, [whether] formal or informal, in
court or out, [is one] where counsel's absence might derogate from the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial."27 The critical inquiry under Wade is whether the
stage is one that may "settle the accused's fate" and render the ultimate trial
"a mere formality."2 8 Its coverage is expansive-it allows the right to coun-
sel to protect confrontations that do not directly bear on determining the
defendant's guilt or innocence.
The Ash method is concerned with the ultimate outcome at trial as well,
although perhaps not as directly.29 The critical inquiry under Ash is whether
the stage is a sufficiently "trial-like confrontation" 3° and whether counsel's
later assistance can overcome the losses sustained at this confrontation.31
Ash's concern with the effects of a later appointment of counsel reveals its
ultimate concern with protecting the outcome at trial. The case actually in-
quires into the effects of counsel's absence on the ultimate trial: Is the stage
sufficiently adversarial and tricky to require the assistance of counsel to pro-
tect against a bad result later in the proceedings? Were it merely asking a
formalist question--does this stage look like a trial?--counsel's later ap-
pointment would be immaterial.
B. Strickland: A Specific Prejudice Inquiry
This Section argues that ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence
and critical stages jurisprudence ask essentially the same question. The inef-
fective assistance of counsel inquiry, articulated in Strickland v.
Washington,32 asks whether counsel's performance may have worked an
unfair outcome on the defendant's case. To establish ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must make two showings. First, he must show that
25. 388 U.S. at 223-25.
26. 413 U.S. at 310-12.
27. 388 U.S. at 226.
28. Id. at 224.
29. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 311 ("The Court consistently has applied a historical interpre-
tation of the guarantee, and has expanded the constitutional right to counsel only when new
contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself." (em-
phasis added)).
30. id. at 312.
31. See id. at 325 (noting that cross-examination is sufficient to overcome any prejudice
sustained during a photo array).
32. 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), governs ineffective
assistance that results in foregoing the right to a trial by pleading guilty. The inquiry is essen-
tially the same: But for counsel's deficient advice, is there a reasonable probability that the
defendant would not have waived his right to go to trial? Id. at 59.
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his lawyer's performance was constitutionally deficient because it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.33 In establishing whether counsel's
performance was objectively unreasonable, the defendant must overcome a
strong presumption that his counsel's conduct was part of a legitimate trial
strategy.34 Only the most egregious conduct will satisfy this prong.
35
Second, the defendant must show that he was prejudiced by his coun-
sel's deficient performance. 36 That is, the defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's specific errors and omis-
sions, the "result" of his proceeding would have been different. "Result," in
this context, contemplates at least the verdict and the sentence. To success-
fully make this claim, the defendant must point to specific errors and
omissions and show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for those
mistakes, he would have been acquitted or received a lesser sentence.
37
The Strickland question is essentially the same as the Ash and Wade
question, only more specific. It asks about actual prejudice to this trial, not
hypothetical prejudice that could result from a given confrontation. But
apart from this difference in specificity, the two questions are materially
indistinguishable. Under Strickland, courts inquire into counsel's specific
errors and their specific effects. Under Ash and Wade, courts inquire into the
general potential of the stage to foul trial rights. While these analyses are
very similar, for completeness's sake, this Note will consider bail under both
formulations.
C. Critical-Stage Analysis and Strickland Prejudice
The conceptual link between ineffective assistance of counsel's preju-
dice prong and critical-stage analysis38 suggests that the Court ought to treat
the two inquiries similarly. If one has the right to counsel at a critical stage,
one ought to have the right to effective assistance from that counsel. Other-
wise, the right to counsel would be meaningless.3 9
33. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
34. Id. at 689.
35. Compare, e.g., Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d. 619, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding a
defendant's conviction on habeas corpus review because his attorney, although he slept
through some of the trial, "was [not] asleep for a substantial portion of his trial"), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1575 (2012), with Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336. 340-41 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (concluding that a defendant's counsel was deficient when he was "repeatedly uncon-
scious through not insubstantial portions of the defendant's capital murder trial"), and Tippins
v. Walker, 77 E3d 682, 685, 690 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding defense counsel deficient when he
was asleep for "numerous extended periods of time").
36. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92.
37. Id. at 693.
38. See Marceau, supra note 22, at 1174-75, for the argument that the right to counsel
and the right to effective assistance inquiries should not be disaggregated.
39. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ("For that reason, the Court has recognized that 'the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" (emphasis added) (quoting
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))).
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The Court has discussed the two inquiries in similar language and has
blended the questions, employing a similar analysis in both. "[W]e have
recognized that certain pretrial events may so prejudice the outcome of the
defendant's prosecution," Justice Alito wrote in Rothgery v. Gillespie County
"that, as a practical matter, the defendant must be represented at those events
in order to enjoy genuinely effective assistance at trial."4° Justice Alito found
the right to appointed counsel at certain critical stages within the right to
effective assistance at trial and described critical stages as employing a
"prejudice" inquiry.
Were the Court to hold that the right to counsel and the right to effective
assistance of counsel are not coterminous, it could produce bizarre results. 4
1
If the Court held that any prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel at
a pretrial proceeding was cured by a subsequent fair trial, the Court would
have to hold that some defendants have a constitutional right to a lawyer, but
they have no enforceable claim to effective assistance.42 Forcing states to
appoint attorneys but not giving defendants any assurance that they will be
remotely effective would be absurd.
4 3
II. EXPANDING STRICKLAND'S PREJUDICE PRONG
TO INCLUDE PLEA BARGAINS
In Lafler v. Cooper"4 and Missouri v. Frye,45 the Supreme Court expand-
ed Strickland's prejudice prong to include the loss of a favorable plea
bargain that the defendant would have taken absent his attorney's deficient
assistance. Before those cases, there were two divergent conceptions of cog-
nizable prejudice under Strickland, one recognizing an outcome-oriented
approach and another recognizing a process-oriented approach. This Part
explains the divergence and concludes that the Court in Cooper and Frye
endorsed a process-oriented approach to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.
The right to effective assistance of counsel was born in Strickland and
with it was born confusion: Does the right protect only the fairness of the
40. 554 U.S. 191, 217 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
41. Marceau, supra note 22, at 1173-75 (arguing that were the Court to deny the right
to effective assistance at a preliminary hearing, it would have to trifurcate the counsel right in
an unfair and unusual manner).
42. Id.
43. Doing so would still leave constructive denial of counsel claims open, but would
foreclose relief from all but the utterly absent or incompetent representative who has ceased to
be a lawyer in the eyes of the law. Compare Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 ("For purposes of
distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, th[e] difference is not of
degree but of kind."), with United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 ("[I]f counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a
denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unre-
liable.").
44. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
45. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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verdict, or does it protect something more? On the one hand, Strickland
stressed that the right to counsel exists "to ensure a fair trial" and that a fair
trial is one that produces "just result[s]" or one "whose result is reliable"-the
outcome approach.' On the other hand, Strickland noted the right's
importance in assuring the "fundamental fairness of the .... adversarial
process"--the process approach.47 These two approaches, while not
fundamentally at odds with one another, have produced divergent
interpretations of what Strickland meant by "result."
The two readings of Strickland presented the Court with a choice in
Cooper and Frye. The Court chose a robust approach to fairness and a broad
interpretation of "results." By incorporating plea negotiations that do not
affect the outcome of a trial into Strickland prejudice, Cooper and Frye ef-
fectively endorsed a process-oriented meaning of "results."
The facts in Cooper were uncontested. Anthony Cooper shot Kali Mun-
dy in the buttocks as she was running away from him.48 Cooper was charged
with assault with intent to murder.49 The local Michigan prosecutor offered
to recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months in prison in exchange for
Cooper's guilty plea.50 But Cooper chose to go to trial because his attorney,
Brian McClean, advised him that he could not possibly be convicted of as-
sault with intent to murder because he shot Mundy below the waist.51 This
advice was wrong. Cooper was convicted in a constitutionally flawless tri-
al.52 He was sentenced to 185 to 360 months in prison-roughly three times
longer than he would have faced had he taken the deal.
53
All agreed that McClean's performance had been woefully deficient.
54
But the State of Michigan argued that Cooper had not been prejudiced be-
cause-to put it simply-he was guilty. At oral arguments, the solicitor
general for Michigan said that "[one is] entitled to effective counsel at every
critical stage; however, it is not a Sixth Amendment violation unless it casts
doubt on the reliability of the adjudication of guilt. '55 Because Cooper had
been convicted in a full and fair jury trial, the State argued, he could not
conceivably have been prejudiced by his attorney's error. The results of a
46. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
47. Id. at 696.






54. Id. at 1384 ("In this case all parties agree the performance of respondent's counsel
was deficient when he advised respondent to reject the plea offer on the grounds he could not
be convicted at trial").
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (No. 10-209); see also
Marceau, supra note 22, at 1175 n.60.
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plea bargain, the State argued, cannot be prejudiced under Strickland be-
cause one does not have a right to a plea bargain.1
6
The Court disagreed. First, the Court observed that "the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants... are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike."57 Cooper's guilt did not foreclose him from relief for ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. Second, the Court acknowledged the overwhelming
importance of plea bargaining to the criminal justice system 58 and observed
that it has become the ordinary course of criminal justice.59 Third, the Court
noted that the right to counsel protects at least some procedures to which
one does not have a constitutional right.60 So, even though one does not have
a right to a plea bargain, because plea bargains are so pervasive and im-
portant, one has "the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering
whether to accept it,"61 whether or not one is guilty. And "[i]f that right is
denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial
resulting in... a more severe sentence. '6
2
In Cooper's companion case, Missouri v. Frye, the Court found ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel where the defendant failed to accept a favorable
plea bargain because his attorney, Michael Coles, simply failed to com-
municate those offers to him.63 Ultimately, Galin Frye pleaded guilty to a
more serious charge without the benefit of the plea bargain he would have
accepted had he known about it.6 Pleas, the Court held in both of these cas-
56. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 4 ("[Wlhen asserting an ineffective
assistance claim, a defendant must show deprivation of a substantive or procedural right, and
this Court has already held that a defendant has no right to a plea bargain.").
57. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. See id. ("[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a sys-
tem of trials."); cf Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("To a large extent... horse
trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how
long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is
the criminal justice system." (alterations in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
59. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 ("The favorable sentence that eluded the defendant
in the criminal proceeding appears to be the sentence he or others in his position would have
received in the ordinary course, absent the failings of counsel."); see also Stephanos Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99
CALIF. L. REv. 1117, 1138 (2011) ("The expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few
percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer
would view full price as the norm and anything less as a bargain."), cited with approval in
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
60. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 ("[Diefendants have a right to effective assistance of
counsel on appeal, even though that cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.").
See generally Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2004) ("The Federal Constitution im-
poses on the States no obligation to provide appellate review of criminal convictions.").
61. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
62. Id.
63. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404-05, 1410 (2012).
64. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
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es, can be prejudiced when the defendant either loses a plea bargain alto-
gether or ends up with a less favorable one than he would have received
absent his attorney's deficient performance.
III. EXPANDING CRITICAL STAGES TO INCLUDE BAIL BECAUSE
BAIL CAN PREJUDICE PLEA BARGAINS
This Part argues that the Court ought to expand critical-stage analysis to
include a stage's potential to affect the outcome of a plea bargain and that a
bail hearing is, therefore, a critical stage. Section III.A argues that bail hear-
ings have the potential to prejudice plea negotiations for criminal defendants
and that they necessarily trigger the attachment of the right to counsel. Sec-
tion III.B contends that critical-stage analysis should be expanded to include
prejudice to plea bargains under the reasoning of Cooper and Frye. Section
III.C concludes that bail determination is therefore now a critical stage un-
der the reasoning of Wade and Ash.
A. Bail Hearings'Prejudicial Effect on Plea Bargains
This Section describes the effects of a bail hearing and concludes that it
requires the presence of counsel. Section III.A.1 argues that bail hearings,
although highly varied in form, always trigger the attachment of the right to
counsel. Section III.A.2 argues that bail hearings, no matter their form, can
prejudice plea bargains because of their ability to force a defendant to plead
guilty.
1. Attachment at a Bail Hearing
Bail hearings are sufficiently formal and judicial to trigger attachment of
the right to counsel.65 The Rothgery Court held that "the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies at the first appearance before a
judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against
him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty," regardless of whether the
public prosecutor knew about the case. 66 This Section asserts that even less
formal bail hearings should trigger the attachment of the right to counsel
because the point when "restrictions are imposed on [the defendant's] liber-
ty" 67 must be the focal point of the attachment inquiry.
Pretrial detention is considered nonpunitive, or at least noncriminal, 68 so
there is an argument that some bail procedures do not trigger attachment of
the right to counsel. In United States v. Salerno, the Court found the Bail
65. Compare Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194-95 (2008) (right attaches
at first formal appearance), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977) (same), with
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) (administrative detention of already-
incarcerated defendants does not constitute an accusation for Sixth Amendment purposes).
66. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 194-95.
67. Id. at 194.
68. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987).
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Reform Act-which allows pretrial detention of a criminal defendant based
on a finding of his future dangerousness69 --constitutional because pretrial
detention is not punishment.70 "Punishment," for constitutional purposes, is
defined by the putative punisher's intent." When that intent is not clear from
the text of the putatively punitive statute, courts are to look to the purposes
of the act and compare them with the severity of the nonpunishment. If it
seems like the nonpunishment fits the noncrime-that is, if the detention
seems within the bounds of society's reasonable interest in regulating be-
havior 2--the defendant is not being punished. Thus, freed from the
shackles of the Constitution, the government need only show that its pretrial
detention is not excessive in relation to its goals.
73
Yet even comparatively informal74 bail procedures-for example Mary-
land's, where the defendant is brought before a bail commissioner and,
perhaps, not formally read the charges against him75-are sufficiently adver-
sarial to render the defendant an "accused" and are distinguishable from
other cases in which the Court found that certain procedures did not trigger
attachment. In United States v. Gouveia, for example, the Court held that
separating already-incarcerated inmates from the general population while
awaiting trial did not count as an accusation for Sixth Amendment purposes
and did not, therefore, trigger the attachment of the right to counsel.76 But
Gouveia is too narrow to support the argument that noncriminal detentions
never trigger the attachment of the right to counsel. First of all, Gouveia's
reasoning rested, in part, on the Court's fear that a different result would
begin the march of a parade of horribles: an in-prison punishing unit, such
as solitary confinement, could trigger the right to counsel and the right to a
formalized hearing.77 This fear is not applicable to an informal bail proceed-
ing: Regardless of the character of the proceeding, a criminal prosecution is
on its way and that is the only purpose of the proceeding. In addition, the
defendants in Gouveia were already subject to significant restrictions on
their liberty before the administrative detention of which they complained
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. 2011).
70. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
71. Id. at 747 ("To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible
punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent.").
72. Id. ("Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the puni-
tive/regulatory distinction turns on 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned [to it].'" (alterations in original) (quoting Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73. Id.
74. That is, less traditionally adversarial and trial-like.
75. Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 14, at 2 n.4.
76. 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984).
77. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 191 (noting that the Sixth Amendment does not protect all
the same concerns of the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee and that to hold otherwise
would dramatically expand the Sixth Amendment right into novel contexts).
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had begun (they were in prison).78 This is not the case when a free defendant
is brought into jail and held on bail by a nonjudicial officer.
Similarly, bail proceedings are sufficiently "judicial," under recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence, to trigger attachment. Rothgery, the Court's
most recent pronouncement on the issue of attachment, spoke of a defend-
ant's "first appearance before a judicial officer."79 Nonetheless, that a bail
commissioner may not be a judge should not be preclusive in the inquiry. An
officer with the power to deprive a defendant of his freedom of movement
for a significant period of time is sufficiently powerful to count as "judicial"
for this narrow purpose." Either way, significant restrictions are placed on
the defendant's liberty as a result of the proceeding and that alone ought to
trigger attachment of the right to counsel. Were the Court to hold otherwise,
it would invite states to design bail procedures such that they would not
have to appoint counsel.
2. Bail Hearings' Potential to Prejudice Plea Bargains
When bail is set by the state, there is always a risk that it will be set at
an amount that the defendant cannot pay. When that happens-and it
happens an awful lot8 1-the defendant will be forced to wait in jail until his
trial, or until he gets a lawyer and petitions for bail review. He can expect to
wait around a month,82 often much more, during which time he may lose his
job, his house, and anything else for which he has recurring financial
responsibilities.83 For petty offenses, either period of detention will often
78. Id. at 180.
79. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (emphasis added).
80. Cf Adam Teitelbaum, Note, Dubious Delegation: Article III Limits on Mental
Health Treatment Decisions, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1553, 1568, 1572-77 (2012) (advocating a
"liberty-centered" framework for determining if a "judicial act" has occurred for nondelega-
tion purposes).
81. In New York, for example, 25 percent of nonfelony defendants are held on bail.
In Baltimore, that number is closer to 50 percent. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 14,
at 1321-22. In New York, the vast majority of such defendants cannot pay their bail. See id.
at 1322. There were approximately 10.5 million nontraffic misdemeanor prosecutions in
this country in 2006. ROBERT C. BOROCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (estimating based on a sample of twelve
states). If the whole country behaves about as well as New York State does, approximately 2.5
million people nationwide are held on bail they cannot pay for misdemeanor charges each
year.
82. See Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, supra note 14, at 383-84
("[M]any states' jurisdictions delay counsel's courtroom advocacy for five, ten, twenty, or
thirty or more days beyond an accused's first appearance before a judicial officer."); Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, supra note 14, at 1322 ("Over half of unconvicted inmates spend at least a
month in jail, and one-quarter of unconvicted inmates spend between two and six months
[before a determination of their guilt].").
83. See generally Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 14, at 1323-27 (discussing col-
lateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions).
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exceed that in the government's plea offer. Many defendants, therefore,
plead guilty to avoid spending further time in jail, regardless of their guilt or
innocence.a4
Bail hearings come in many different shapes, but all do the same
thing--decide whether to grant bail, determine its appropriate amount, and
set conditions of release. Some jurisdictions combine bail hearings with
arrests at a central booking facility (e.g., Baltimore);8 5 others combine bail
hearings with probable cause hearings (e.g., New York).86 Regardless of the
specific procedures, all bail hearings share one function-determining the
defendant's freedom pending trial.
Although bail procedures vary from state to state, this Note argues that a
bail hearing is always a critical stage. Under current jurisprudence, whether
a particular stage of criminal proceedings is critical, and therefore whether a
defendant has the right to the presence of counsel, is a fact-specific in-
quiry.87 But no matter what the specific bail procedure is, it affects the
defendant's pretrial liberty. It is this feature that can all but force the defend-
ant to plead guilty;88 any proceeding at which the defendant's liberty before
trial is at stake, no matter what it is called, risks severely prejudicing the
defendant's plea decision. This fact renders the stage critical in light of the
Court's recent expansion of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence
to include lost favorable plea bargains.
Under the trial-centric model that arguably prevailed before Cooper and
Frye, bail may not have been a critical stage because bail hearings do not
directly implicate the defendant's culpability. The parties at a bail hearing
argue about whether the defendant is a flight risk89 or a risk to his communi-
ty,90 not about whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. But now that the
Court has recognized the importance of plea bargains to the administration
84. Id. at 1322, 1346-47; see also Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in
the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957,987 (1989).
85. Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 20, at 1733.
86. See Fitzpatrick v. Rosenthal, 809 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731-32 (App. Div. 2006) (explain-
ing New York's "reasonable cause" determination and noting that "reasonable cause is the
equivalent of probable cause"); see also Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 14, at 2 n.4, 4
n. 12 (describing other variations in initial bail hearings).
87. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plurality opinion) (holding that
Alabama's preliminary hearing is a critical stage after examining its specific functions).
88. Why not argue that these pleas are, by virtue of this capacity, involuntary? Maybe
they are. That question is beyond the scope of this Note but is a promising subject for future
research.
89. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951) ("[T]he fixing of bail for any individual
defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of
that defendant.... If bail in an amount greater than that usually fixed for serious charges of
crimes is required in the case of any of the petitioners, that is a matter to which evidence
should be directed in a hearing so that the constitutional rights of each petitioner may be pre-
served.").
90. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding pretrial detention based
on "future dangerousness" constitutional).
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of criminal justice, it can recognize that bail hearings can prejudice the plea
bargaining process. That makes bail a critical stage.
B. Critical-Stage Analysis After Cooper and Frye
Cooper and Frye suggest that the Court should expand critical-stage
analysis to include a stage's potential to affect the outcome of a plea bar-
gain. Under this framework, bail would qualify as a critical stage. Cooper
and Frye reason that (1) plea bargains represent the overwhelming majority
of criminal convictions in this country,91 (2) the right to counsel protects at
least some things to which one does not have a constitutional right,92 and
(3) a later, constitutionally pristine jury trial does not cure the prejudice in-
curred at the plea bargain.93 A bail hearing fits neatly into each of these three
arguments.
Pretrial detention is a big problem in this country. Approximately 7.8
million people are held before trial in our nation's jails each year.94 For
many of these people, the moment when bail was determined was the mo-
ment when their fate was sealed. While the bail hearing may not be the
criminal justice system, neither is it some embarrassing adjunct; indeed, a
substantial portion of criminal punishment in this country is determined at
bail hearings. In Cooper and Frye, the Court expressed a willingness to con-
sider plea bargains as the subject of Strickland prejudice in large part
because of their pervasive importance to the administration of criminal jus-
tice. Bail shares this pervasive importance.
A criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to bail,95 but
bail, once offered, can nonetheless occasion the right to counsel. First of all,
if bail is offered, it may only be set at "an amount reasonably calculated [to
ensure the defendant's presence at trial]. ' 96 Any higher amount is "exces-
sive" under the Eighth Amendment's bail clause.97
Second, substantive due process-which requires that restrictions on
fundamental liberties be narrowly tailored to suit a compelling state inter-
est-applies to the literal freedom of movement taken by pretrial
91. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("[P]lea bargaining .... is the
criminal justice system." (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (citing Halbert v. Michigan, 445
U.S. 605 (2005) (right to counsel on petition for leave to file first appeal even if discretion-
ary)).
93. See id. at 1387 ("[P]rejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a
trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sen-
tence.").
94. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 14, at 1321-22 (around thirteen million people
enter U.S. jails each year and around 60 percent of those are in jail pending trial).
95. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752 ("The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by
providing merely that '[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.' This Clause, of course, says
nothing about whether bail shall be available at all." (alteration in original)).
96. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951)).
97. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
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detention. 98 Bail, therefore, also presents a risk of violating the Due Process
Clause. Like guilty pleas, bail poses the risk of significant unfairness once it
is granted, even though it is at least possible that there is no constitutional
infirmity in denying it altogether.99 So, under the logic of Cooper and Frye,
a constitutional right to counsel at a bail hearing is not foreclosed by the
lack of a constitutional right to bail in the first place."°
Lastly, the prejudice from a bad bail hearing is not cured by a subse-
quent determination of guilt. Many convictions following pretrial detention
are guilty pleas made only to get out of jail pretrial. For these pleas, guilt
has not been reliably determined at all. Moreover, the critical-stage inquiry
asks its questions in the abstract. 01 Although an individual bail hearing may
be flawless even without counsel, and although a later jury trial may confirm
that the defendant is guilty, many bail hearings may have reached a different
and more defendant-friendly result if the defendant had counsel. These
many bail hearings are sufficient to make bail a critical stage.
C. A Bail Hearing Is Now a Critical Stage
As explained in Section I.A, there are two basic methods of critical-
stage inquiry. The Wade approach emphasizes a stage's potential to foul the
future trial. The Ash approach focuses on the similarity of the stage to a tri-
al. Considering the conceptual link between critical-stage jurisprudence and
prejudice analysis under Strickland,02 as well as the Court's expansion of
prejudice in Cooper and Frye to include pleas, both of these strands support
finding bail to be a critical stage.
The Wade method, in light of Cooper and Frye, fairly obviously renders
bail a critical stage. Wade asks about the potential for a stage to render the
subsequent trial a "mere formality" by predetermining its outcome.'0 3 Cooper
98. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749-51.
99. With respect to the substantive due process inquiry under Salerno, it seems very
unlikely that the Court would find the complete denial of pretrial release narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest. But because it seems almost impossible that a state would hold all
accused defendants in jail until their trials, we will likely never know the answer.
100. There is a line of cases recognizing the right to certain procedural devices as protec-
tors of things to which one does not have a constitutional right. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (right to subsidized trial transcript on felony appeal); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (right to counsel on direct appeal); Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971) (right to a subsidized transcript for a fine-only misdemeanor);
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 (1985) (right to effective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (right to an attorney on petition to file
first appeal from a guilty plea even though discretionary). Analogously, the Court has also
recognized that a due process right attaches to the removal of welfare benefits even though the
Constitution imposes no affirmative obligation on the government to provide those benefits.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
101. See supra Section I.A.
102. See supra Section I.B.
103. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
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and Frye expand the object of prejudice to include plea bargains."° So, be-
cause bail has the potential to make plea bargains a "mere formality,"' 5 bail
is a critical stage under Wade.
The argument under Ash is slightly more involved. Ash remains con-
cerned with the ultimate outcome of the criminal proceedings. 10 6 Its concern
manifests in two questions: First, is the stage sufficiently trial-like to render
the presence of counsel necessary to protect the defendant's rights?0 7 And
second, would the later appointment of counsel at trial be insufficient to cure
any problems her earlier absence may have caused?'0 8
Given Cooper and Frye's expansion of prejudice, both of these questions
are answered in the affirmative with respect to bail. Counsel at a bail hearing
is effective at protecting a defendant's rights"° and-given the possibility
for constitutional violations at a bail hearing-counsel is necessary to pro-
tect those rights." 0 Furthermore, the prejudice worked by a bad bail hearing
cannot always be undone by the later appointment of counsel. While a de-
fendant who is convicted may be able to have the time he spent in jail taken
off his sentence as time served, that prospect seems exceedingly rare given
recent jurisprudence on bail."'I It would do nothing for a defendant who is
ultimately acquitted. And further still, many bad bail hearings result in the
types of guilty pleas described above where the defendant's sentence is less
than the amount of time spent in jail preconviction anyway.
IV. A NARROW BUT VALUABLE RIGHT
This Part argues that defendants should enjoy the right to appointed coun-
sel at a bail proceeding because that proceeding is a unique post-attachment
critical stage whose maladministration can cause serious problems to the
criminal justice system. Section IV.A asserts that ball is unique in its capacity
to prejudice pleas but not trials. Section IV.B concludes that the bail system
described above is broken, that appointing counsel will help improve it, and
that the savings to states from increasing the pretrial release rate may out-
weigh the costs in additional lawyers.
104. See supra Part II.
105. See supra Section Hl.A.2.
106. See supra Section I.A.
107. See supra Section I.A.
108. See supra Section I.A.
109. See Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 20, at 1720.
110. See Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 14, at 5-6.
111. Compare, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 659-61 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding constitutional an increase in the amount of monetary bail because the defendant was
found to be dangerous), with Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1951) (asserting that the only
permissible purpose of bail is to assure the defendant's presence at trial).
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A. Direct and Indirect Prejudice: Bail Is Unique
Bail is the only post-attachment stage that works its prejudice on the plea
bargaining process directly, and not by changing the probability of conviction
at trial. This unique capacity means that the Court can find bail to be a criti-
cal stage without overturning prior cases or finding earlier stages of the
criminal process to be critical stages as well.
Prejudice to a plea negotiation can come in at least two forms. An event
can either change the likelihood of conviction at trial, and thus the bar-
gained-for sentence of a plea deal, or it can directly affect the likelihood that
the defendant will plead guilty-or both. A corporeal lineup is a good ex-
ample of the former. A bad outcome at a lineup changes the outcome of a
plea negotiation, but only because it changes the likely outcome of the trial,
and that change is reflected in the bargained-for sentence. Bail is different.
Although bail likely does have an effect on the outcome at trial," 2 it has an
independent effect on the outcome of a plea negotiation. If a defendant must
wait in jail pending trial or bail review, he becomes much more likely to
plead guilty even if his chances at trial are unchanged.
This effect is fundamentally different from a change in the likely out-
come at trial and therefore requires a different analysis. Other stages that
prejudice plea negotiations via prejudice to the likely outcome at trial can be
handled under existing critical stages jurisprudence.1,3 Their capacity to af-
fect plea results is more or less identical to their capacity to affect trials. But
bail is different. Bail's strongest effect may be on pleas and not trials.' 14 Be-
cause bail's effects are fundamentally different from the effects of other
stages, bail needs to be analyzed under a different rubric.
Due to this unique feature of the bail stage, finding it to be a critical
stage will not require overturning prior case law. Imagine a stage other than
bail that affects the outcome of a plea negotiation but does not do so by af-
fecting the outcome of a would-be subsequent trial. Such a stage would have
to have an effect mostly unrelated to a defendant's likely outcome at trial but
112. See Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 20, at 1749-62 (citing results
of a controlled study for the proposition that adverse bail determinations detrimentally affect
the outcome of a criminal case, ceteris paribus).
113. A preliminary hearing-at which a judge determines whether there is sufficient
evidence to continue a felony prosecution-can affect the outcome of a plea bargain but only
by affecting the outcome of the ultimate trial, either by the result or by whatever evidence may
come to light during the hearing. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plurality
opinion). The same can be said of post-indictment interrogations. Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). Preventive detention hearings of the type contemplated by Salerno
already occasion the presence of counsel. See Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. V
2011) ("At the hearing, [the defendant] has the right to be represented by counsel, and, if fi-
nancially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed."). Therefore,
finding bail to be a critical stage would not change the analysis.
114. There are, of course, times where the converse would be true. Imagine, say, a seri-
ous felony prosecution where the sentence on offer is almost certainly greater than the
expected wait for a trial. Whether the defendant is or is not released pretrial will make very
little difference on his bargaining position.
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nonetheless provide him with an incentive to plea. The only pretrial proce-
dures that can conceivably meet both of these conditions involve events
external to the progress of the criminal proceeding altogether. One example
may be a threat by the government to prosecute a loved one: such a threat
can induce a guilty plea but is totally unrelated to the outcome of the de-
fendant's trial.
Procedures besides bail hearings that meet these criteria are almost cer-
tainly pre-attachment. Pre-indictment plea bargaining, for example-at
which one does not currently have the right to counsel' ' 5-is distinguishable
from a bail hearing. Imagine a prosecutor approaches a defendant with a
plea deal before even charging or arresting him. Pre-charge plea bargaining
of this type occurs before the attachment of the right to counsel and, there-
fore, does not trigger critical-stage analysis. There have been no restrictions
on the defendant's liberty, no formal appearances before judicial officers,
and no accusations for Sixth Amendment purposes. Furthermore, this
charge-bargaining would likely affect the outcome of any subsequent trial.
The more serious and more numerous the charges, the greater the likely sen-
tence at trial. This is not necessarily true of bail.
B. The Broken Bail System
Our criminal justice system is replacing trials with plea bargains." 6 Plea
bargaining is only conceivably legitimate insofar as it reliably separates the
innocent from the guilty.117 When the bargaining process is functioning well,
the bargained-for sentence approximates the expected sentence if the parties
had gone to trial, with a discount for avoiding the time, hassle, and risk a
trial imposes." 8 During a healthy plea negotiation, the government and the
defendant may exchange information about the relative merits of their cas-
es and come to a mutually beneficial agreement-one that simultaneously
115. E.g., United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2000) (pre-indictment
plea bargaining does not require the assistance of counsel).
116. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("To a large extent ... horse
trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how
long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is
the criminal justice system." (alterations in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
117. There is abundant literature on guilty pleas. Pleas are defended insofar as they accu-
rately reflect guilt or innocence at trial. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2464, 2531 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the
Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. Rv.
1117, 1132 (2011); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969, 1970-71 (1992); Corrinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland
in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2002); Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). But see Stephen J. Schulho-
fer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1981 (1992).
118. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 117, at 23-26 (arguing that in a perfect-information plea
bargain, the agreed-upon sentence will equal the expected sentence at trial with a discount for
avoiding the trial rigmarole).
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reflects a reasonable administration of punishment and minimizes the down-
side risk for both the defendant and the government.
When a defendant pleads guilty to avoid sitting in jail before trial, this
process breaks down. The defendant's guilty plea no longer reflects an ad-
mission that he is, in fact, guilty. Rather, it is a simple and unavoidable
consequence of the bail hearing. When an incarcerated defendant is offered
a plea deal that allows him to go home, he would plead not guilty if and on-
ly if the collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction were more
important to him than the time he will spend in jail, or if he stands on the
principle that one should not plead guilty to a crime he did not commit.
Many defendants do not fall into these categories.
Even if they did, the bargaining process between the defendant and the
state would cease to function like an ordinary plea negotiation. The discus-
sion would no longer be about how much punishment the defendant
deserved or even the odds of his conviction at trial. Instead, the plea bargain
would become a simple take-it-or-leave-it offer wholly unrelated to the
strength of the evidence against him. In the way that an unfavorable out-
come at a corporeal lineup can render a later trial a "mere formality,""19 a
bad bail hearing can render the outcome of a subsequent plea negotiation a
mere formality. Rather than sit in jail, the defendant will plead guilty to any
offer that lets him go free.
A significant number of criminal convictions are the direct results of bail
hearings without counsel. These convictions do not reflect the defendant's
culpability. '20 Rather, they are the results of proceedings designed to inquire
into the likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial on his own recog-
nizance. That procedure may leave the defendant with no reasonable choice
but to plead guilty, regardless of his guilt or innocence. This is bad.
Although innocent defendants may plead guilty to avoid the risk of a
worse result at trial,' 2' those who plead guilty to escape pretrial detention do
so for reasons of a different kind. The innocent defendant who balances the
risk of conviction at trial with the certainty of a lesser sentence at least does
so because there is some risk of conviction. In part, his decision is related to
his odds at trial, and those odds are the criminal justice system's best proxy
for his likely guilt or innocence. The defendant who pleads guilty to escape
pretrial detention does so for reasons entirely apart from his culpability. He
does so because, no matter what the outcome at trial, he is better off admit-
ting false guilt than asserting true innocence. This is unacceptable.
Even for guilty defendants, pleas made to avoid pretrial detention are
unacceptable. Although it may be easier to administer punishment for petty
offenses without meaningful proof of guilt, doing so erodes the foundation
119. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 218 (1967).
120. Although, of course, the judge must be satisfied that a factual basis exists for the
defendant's guilty plea, this requirement is very lax. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding sufficient a guilty plea even where the defendant says in open
court that he did not commit the crime charged).
121. Id. at 31.
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on which criminal judgments rest-a determination of fact leading to a be-
lief that someone is worthy of condemnation and punishment.
122
Some may argue that pleas to time served avoid the hassle, risk, and
taxpayer expense of trials for relatively minor offenses. To this, I offer two
responses. First, this Note discusses the potential of bail to affect the
outcome of a plea negotiation in the abstract. While sometimes pretrial
detention may not prejudice the outcome of a plea bargain, and although
some pleas may be just and expedient, many times this is just not the case.
These many instances make bail a critical stage.
Second, providing counsel at a bail hearing will not render fast and con-
venient guilty pleas impossible. Doing so will only assure that there are
adequate procedural protections to make sure these pleas are not forced on
defendants who should not be held before trial in the first place.
Counsel at bail hearings will help solve this problem. Although some de-
fendants will continue to be held on bail pending trial, and although some
will continue to plead guilty to avoid the wait, fewer will do so. And those
who do will have, at least, had an opportunity to fairly contest their pretrial
detention and to have had the advice of counsel in accepting or rejecting the
plea offer.
Indeed, because the forced pleas described almost exclusively arise in
the context of low-level misdemeanor charges, counsel will likely be even
more effective at securing the defendant's release before trial. Since defend-
ants facing more serious charges are more likely to flee before trial, courts
are permitted to use the seriousness of the alleged offense as a factor in set-
ting appropriate bail. 123 Facing prosecution for a low-level offense,
therefore, a defendant with a lawyer should be able to get the judge to set
bail in a reasonable amount, barring an extraordinary criminal history.
124
Most constitutional criminal procedure rules come at a cost, be it in
guilty defendants set free, trials slowed, bureaucracy burdened, or the public
reputation of the proceedings tarred with the epithets of "technicalities.'
' 25
But the new rule this Note proposes might actually be a net winner. The
costs saved by states in reducing pretrial detention will likely suffice to off-
set the added costs for additional lawyers to represent indigent defendants in
bail hearings. 126 And there is good reason to believe that substantially lower-
ing the rate of pretrial detention will do little to increase the rate at which
122. For a discussion of the procedural and funding reasons that may drive non-merit-
based resolution of criminal adjudications, see generally Willam J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Justice and Criminal Procedure, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37-45 (1997)
[hereinafter Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship]. See also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
123. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. , 4 n.3 (1951) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c)).
124. See id.
125. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship, supra note 122, at 56.
126. See Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 20, at 1757 n.122 (citing Md.
Gen. Assem., Dep't of Legislative Servs., Fiscal Note to S.B. 138 (2000)) (projecting cost
savings of 4.5 million dollars if the State appoints lawyers at bail hearings).
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defendants on bail fail to appear or are apprehended for other violations.127
Either way, counsel will likely only be securing the release of marginal de-
fendants who may have gotten out pretrial anyway; the most apparently
dangerous defendants remain unlikely to be released. Therefore, there is
scant reason to believe that counsel will substantially increase socially bad
outcomes pretrial. And that means there is scant reason to believe that it will
substantially increase costs. So, recognizing a constitutional obligation on
the part of states to provide counsel at bail hearings will likely reduce their
criminal justice budgets.
CONCLUSION
Critical stages jurisprudence and prejudice jurisprudence under Strick-
land share a similar goal and deserve similar treatment by the Court.
Because the Court has recently expanded Strickland prejudice to encompass
a lost plea bargain, the Court, therefore, ought to expand critical stages to
include those with the potential to foul future plea bargains. A bail hearing
is the only stage of any state's criminal proceeding that has the ability to
prejudice a plea negotiation by any mechanism other than changing the like-
ly outcome at trial. As such, a bail hearing is now a critical stage, and
defendants have the attendant right to counsel at these hearings.
127. Cf. Susan Dely, Implementing STARR in Federal Pretrial Services, NEWS AND
VIEWS: A BI-WEEKLY NEWSLETTER OF THE UNITED STATES PROBATION AND PRETRIAL
SERVICES SYSTEM, April 11, 2011, at 4 ("[The Eastern District of Michigan] has one of the
highest release rates and one of the lowest failure-to-appear rates in the country.
(emphases added)).
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